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Abstract
This article presents a complete picture of the remarkable recent movement in China
towards allowing an ad hoc arbitration that originates in the numerous Free Trade Zones
(“FTZs”). This article analyzes the decision of the Chinese judicial system to consider the
validity of an ad hoc arbitration agreements, which are currently subject to strict prohibition
by the Chinese Arbitration Law. The article then analyzes the Chinese Supreme People’s
Court’s (“SPC”) recent announcement regarding open ad hoc arbitration originating in FTZs.
After comparing three available ad hoc arbitration rules, the article describes the numerous
factors to consider in creating a Chinese model for ad hoc arbitration rules. Taking the
deficiencies of the legislative and regulatory resources into account, the article also addresses
several required conditions for conducting ad hoc arbitration in mainland China. Ultimately,
the article argues that China should at least prepare itself in fields of legislation, judicial
supervision, available arbitration rules, and human resources to construct a workable ad hoc
arbitration regime.
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1

Introduction

With China increasingly becoming an important player in the international arbitration
world, the unique Chinese practice of prohibiting ad hoc arbitration will eventually impede
the development of arbitration and prevent China from attracting international arbitration
business. Although the Chinese judicial system, led by the Chinese Supreme People’s Court
(“SPC”), has promoted a series of judicial reforms and legal rulings to coordinate domestic
arbitration and international practice, it has not yet properly addressed the subject of ad hoc
arbitration. After a series of iconic decisions, the SPC has finally found a workable approach
to get around restrictions of the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China,( “CAL”).

Chinese courts have consistently made divergent and confusing judgments on the validity
of ad hoc arbitration agreements for domestic, foreign-related, and international disputes.
When the Chinese arbitration market started to take off, the Chinese arbitration community
began to discuss whether they have reached the right moment to officially embrace ad hoc
arbitration. In 2017, the SPC announced that it would experimentally permit ad hoc
arbitration originating in the Free Trade Zones (“FTZs”). This article indicates that, apart
from this single announcement by the SPC, the existing Chinese arbitration system is
woefully underprepared for the emerging ad hoc arbitration market. Before practitioners
celebrate this meaningful and long-anticipated news, this article proposes that China should
make more efforts to reform its arbitration system to prepare China in providing adequate
support for the potential development of the ad hoc arbitration business.

This article analyzes the decision of the Chinese judicial system to consider the validity of
37

ad hoc arbitration agreements, which are currently subject to strict prohibition by the Chinese
Arbitration Law. After analyzing the SPC’s recent announcement and comparing three
available ad hoc arbitration rules, the article describes the numerous factors to consider for
creating a Chinese model for ad hoc arbitration rules. Taking the deficiencies of the
legislative and regulation resources into account, the article addresses several required
conditions for conducting ad hoc arbitration in mainland China. Ultimately, the article argues
that China should at least prepare itself in fields of legislation, judicial supervision, available
arbitration rules, and human resources to construct a workable ad hoc arbitration regime.

2
a

Reforming Chinese Ad Hoc Arbitration
Background

It is widely known in the international arbitration world that Article 18 of CAL
implicitly prohibits ad hoc arbitration. Article 18 provides: “If . . . the arbitration commission
is not agreed to by the parties in the arbitration agreement, or, if the relevant provisions are
not clear, the parties may supplement the agreement. If the parties fail to agree upon the
supplementary agreement, the arbitration agreement shall be invalid.”1 This provision means
that only arbitration agreements designating qualified arbitration institutions or commissions
are valid in mainland China. Commentators have argued that the underlying purpose of this
rule is to protect the development of Chinese arbitration institutions.2 Academics have

Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 8th Standing Meeting Nat’l People’s
Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective 1 Sept. 1, 1995), art 18 (China).
1

Jingzhou Tao & Clarisse von Wunschheim, Articles 16 and 18 of the PRC Arbitration Law: the Great Wall of
China for Foreign Arbitration Institutions, 23 ARB. INT'L 309 (2007).
2
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explained that arbitration was a completely new mechanism for the resolution of disputes
when CAL was promulgated and that China does not have a tradition of arbitration or the
experience to support effective ad hoc arbitral proceedings.3 To guarantee fairness and
justice in arbitration, therefore, it was more appropriate to restrain arbitral jurisdiction to
competent arbitration institutions.4

In the beginning, only two arbitration institutions were eligible to administer foreignrelated arbitration: the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(“CIETAC”) and the China Maritime Arbitration Commission (“CMAC”).5 These two
arbitration institutions rapidly dominated the alternative dispute resolution market in China.6
Meanwhile, the Chinese institutional arbitration market has been rapidly expanding. In early
2017, the number of arbitration institutions has quickly grown to 255, coming close to the
maximum allowed by CAL.7 In some big cities, there are more than three local arbitration

Standing Meeting National People’s Congress Law Commission, Interpretation on Arbitration Law of the
People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Fa lv chu ban she, 1997).
3

4

Id.

Jian Zhou, Arbitration Agreements in China: Battles on Designation of Arbitral Institution and Ad Hoc
Arbitration, 23 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 145, 148 (2006).
5

Circular of the Regarding Some Problems Which Need to Be Clarified for the Implementation of the
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by General Office of the State Council, Jun. 8,
1996, effective Jun. 8, 1996) Guo ban fa [1996] No 22, which provides that “the main duties of the reorganized
arbitration commissions shall be to accept domestic arbitration cases. Where the parties to a foreign-related
arbitration case voluntarily select arbitration by a reorganized arbitration commission, such commission may
accept the case.”
6

Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 8th Standing Meeting Nat’l People’s
Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective 1 Sept. 1, 1995), art 10 (China). “Arbitration commissions may be established in
the municipalities directly under the Central Government, in the municipalities where the people's governments
of provinces and autonomous regions are located or, if necessary, in other cities divided into districts.
Arbitration commissions shall not be established at each level of the administrative divisions.”
7
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institutions.8

The Chinese institutional arbitration market is unprecedentedly prosperous and
complicated due to competition and a delicate relationship among institutions.9 In 2015, for
example, arbitration institutions located in mainland China administered 136,924 arbitration
cases in total, 2,085 of which were foreign-related arbitrations. The total disputed monetary
amount reached 411.2 billion RMB.10 In 2016, CIETAC administered 2,183 arbitration
cases, 485 of which were foreign-related.11 Demonstrated by these numbers, CIETAC has
rapidly grown into one of the busiest arbitration institutions in the world.

The Chinese prohibition of ad hoc arbitration has eventually led to an awkward dilemma
in arbitral practice. According to Article I of the New York Convention (“the Convention”) on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, both ad hoc and institutional
arbitral awards can be recognized and enforced.12 Therefore, if an ad hoc arbitral award is
rendered correctly in a signatory of the Convention and submitted for the enforcement in
mainland China, Chinese courts must recognize and enforce the award. Ironically, an ad hoc
arbitral award rendered in mainland China will be set aside or refused enforcement due to an

For example, there are CIETAC Shanghai Commission, Shanghai Arbitration Commission and Shanghai
International Arbitration Center in Shanghai, China. Shenzhen and Guangzhou also have same situation.
8

Chen Meng, Is CIETAC Breaking Apart? An Analysis of the Split in the CIETAC System, 6(1) CONTEMP. ASIA
ARB. J. 107 (2013).
9

10

China Academy of Arbitration Law, CHINESE ARBITRATION ANNUAL REPORT 2015, 26-30 (2016).

CIETAC, Statistics, http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=40&l=en (last visited Sep. 30,
2017).
11

The 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330 UNTS 38, art I,
“The term ‘arbitral awards’ shall include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also
those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have submitted.” [hereinafter New York
Convention].
12
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invalid arbitration agreement subject to CAL. Concisely, all arbitration agreements
designating ad hoc arbitration that are governed by the CAL will be considered invalid and
will consequently make arbitral awards unenforceable under the Convention. The situation
becomes more complicated when it involves Hong Kong and Macau, which have legal
systems that are comparatively independent from that of mainland China. The mutual
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards among mainland China, Hong Kong and
Macau is governed by several arrangements issued by the SPC.13 These arrangements
provide grounds for refusing enforcement that are similar to those of the Convention.14
Because both Hong Kong and Macau arbitration laws allow ad hoc arbitration, ad hoc arbitral
awards rendered in Hong Kong and Macau are enforceable in mainland China, while the
reverse is not the case.15 Hong Kong and Macau, therefore, become perfect places to conduct
ad hoc arbitration and avoid the negative influence of CAL.

Even though forum shopping or designating a foreign governing law to validate ad hoc
arbitration agreements16 are two possible solutions to getting around CAL,17 Chinese courts
have consistently struggled over deciding the validity of various ad hoc arbitration
Arrangements of the Supreme People’s Court on the Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the
Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 1, 2000)
Fa shi [2000] No 3; Arrangement between the Mainland and the Macau SAR on Reciprocal Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitration Awards, (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 1, 2008) Fa shi [2007] No 17.
13

14

HUANG YAYING, CHINESE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW COURSE 320 (Xiamen University Press, 2017).

Gu Weixia, The Changing Landscape of Arbitration Agreements in China: Has The SPC-led Proarbitration
Move Gone Far Enough? 22 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 50 (2009); José Alejandro Carballo Leyda, A Uniform,
Internationally Oriented Legal Framework for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in
Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan? 6 CHINESE J. INTL’ L. 345, 345(2007).
15

Law on Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations (promulgated by the Standing Meeting
National People’s Congress, 28 October 2010, effective 1 April 2011), Art 18.
16

Tietie Zhang, Enforceability of Ad Hoc Arbitration Agreements in China: China’s Incomplete Ad Hoc
Arbitration System, 46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 361, 372 (2013).
17
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agreements.18 In many cases, the SPC has insisted that purely domestic disputants cannot
select foreign arbitration laws to govern their ad hoc arbitration agreements or select Hong
Kong or other foreign seats of arbitration to get around CAL.19 Therefore, even though
choice-of-law rule and forum shopping can save some ad hoc arbitration agreements, unfair
treatment between purely domestic and extraterritorial ad hoc arbitral awards makes the
unique Chinese practice of prohibiting ad hoc arbitration less and less reasonable.

b

Relaxing restrictions on the validity of ad hoc arbitration agreements

Even though the CAL requires a valid arbitration agreement to designate a qualified
arbitral institution, the Chinese judicial system has consistently utilized its powers of
interpretation and discretion to save as many arbitration agreements as possible.

In October 1995, only two months after CAL took effect, the SPC, in its Reply to the
Higher People's Court of Guangdong Province, stated that parties of foreign-related cases can
select ad hoc arbitration held in a foreign country.20 Despite potential conflicts with CAL and
inconsistent judicial practices, the SPC was inclined to enforce arbitration agreements

18

See discussion infra Section II.B.

Zhao Xiuwen, Arbitrating Disputes with Chinese Entities in RENMIN UNIVERSITY CHINA LAW SUMMER
TEACHING MATERIALS 114, 118-9 (2004); Jingzhou Tao, Salient Issues in Arbitration in China, 27 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 807, 826 (2012).
19

Prod. Materials Corp. of Fujian Province v. Jinge Shipping Co. Ltd., 1995 FA HAN NO. 135, Oct.20, 1995
(Sup. People’s Ct. 1995). In foreign-related cases where parties have agreed in the contract in advance or
reached an agreement after the dispute occurs that the dispute should be arbitrated by a foreign ad hoc
arbitration institution or nonpermanent arbitration institution, the validity of such an arbitration agreement
should be recognized in principle. The court shall not accept the case.
20
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designating ad hoc arbitration to resolve foreign-related disputes outside of China.21

Subsequently, in a 1996 judicial ruling, the SPC instructed the High People’s Court of
Fujian Province to hold an ad hoc arbitration agreement valid based on the parties having
selected ICC arbitration rules, which implied that they had selected the ICC as their
administrating arbitral institution.22 In 2003, the SPC issued a draft version of the Provisions
on Handling Foreign-Related Arbitrations and Arbitrations Adjudicated Abroad by People's
Courts (“Draft Provision”),23 which included the following articles:
Article 20. People’s courts should hold arbitration agreements invalid in case
of [the] following situations: . . . (6) agreed arbitration institution does not exist
or agreed ad hoc arbitration[,] but the arbitration agreement does not provide
rules for constituting arbitral tribunal, and parties could not reach supplemental
agreement. . . .
Article 26. Parties agreed an institutional arbitration rule to govern the
arbitration rather than submit their disputes to the arbitration institution, the
People’s Courts should consider [that] the arbitration institution can administer
the disputes. . . .
Article 27. An ad hoc arbitration agreement will not be valid unless the
domestic law of each party's country recognizes ad hoc arbitration and . . . all
parties to the arbitration must come from contracting countries of the New York
Convention.24
The Draft Provision reflected that, the SPC’s approach regarding the validity of ad hoc

Jian Zhou, Arbitration Agreements in China: Battles on Designation of Arbitral Institution and Ad Hoc
Arbitration, 23 J. INT’L ARB. 145, 166 (2006). Nove Nordisk v. Hainan Ji Zhong, 1996 FA JING HAN NO. 499,
Dec. 20, 1996 (Sup. People’s Ct. 1996) (holding that an arbitration agreement designating London as the place
of arbitration was invalid because the parties failed to choose an arbitral institution).
21

Weige Wood Craft Ltd. Co. v. Taiwan Fuyuan Enterprise Ltd. Co., 1996 FA FA NO. 78 (Sup. People’s Ct.
1996).
22

Supreme People’s Ct., Provisions on Handling Foreign-Related arbitrations and Arbitrations Adjudicated
Abroad by People’s Courts, People’s Court Daily, Dec. 31, 2003, at 1-3.
23

24

Id.
43

arbitration agreements has gone through the following fundamental changes. First, ad hoc
arbitration taking place outside of China is now acceptable. Second, an arbitration agreement
designating existing institutional rules can be read as implicitly designating the relevant
institution; it thus conforms to CAL. Third, Article 20(6) of the Draft Provision implies that
ad hoc arbitration agreements that provide rules for constituting arbitral tribunals may be
valid. In sum, the Draft Provision awkwardly indicates that ad hoc arbitration agreements
between parties from New York Convention signatories are valid if the domestic law of all
parties allows ad hoc arbitration. It was clear that the SPC attempted to take a completely
different approach to CAL in the Draft Provision.

There is a controversy, however, over the question of whether the SPC has exceeded its
power of judicial interpretation by issuing these provisions, which were quite possibly in
contradiction with the existing CAL. The immature Draft Provision indicated the SPC’s proarbitration but still uncertain attitude towards ad hoc arbitration taking place in mainland
China. Regrettably, the SPC deleted the above provisions in the official version of the judicial
interpretation regarding foreign-related arbitration, which it issued later.25 The Draft
Provision nonetheless had a profound influence on lower courts’ relevant practice. For
example, the Xiamen Intermediate Court, applying the Draft Provision, held valid an ad hoc
arbitration agreement asking for ad hoc arbitration to take place in Beijing, China following
ICC arbitration rules.

In XiangYu Group Co. v Mechel Trading AG (MTA), the Chinese company XiangYu signed

25

Gu Weixia, supra note 15, at 39.
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a steel sales contract with MTA, a Swiss company. It included an arbitration clause providing
that “disputes related to or which arise from this contract shall be arbitrated by one or more
arbitrators according to ICC arbitration rules. Arbitration will take place in Beijing, China.”26
At the beginning of its verdict, the Xiamen Intermediate Court declared that the arbitral
clause was an ad hoc arbitration agreement, despite the fact that the CAL did not admit ad
hoc arbitration in mainland China.27 The Court further explained, however, that according to
the 2003 Draft Provision, the selection of ICC arbitration rules was enough for the
constitution of arbitral tribunals, and it also implied that the ICC Arbitration Court shall
administer the arbitration.28 The Court’s verdict was that the ad hoc arbitration clause was
valid. This was the first valid arbitration agreement, which applied foreign institutional rules
and permitted the parties to seek ad hoc arbitration in mainland China. Although no
subsequent Chinese court decision has gone this far, the decision shows that the Chinese
judicial system was exploring a legitimate approach to accepting ad hoc arbitration for
foreign-related disputes no matter where the arbitration would take place. The SPC gradually
expanded the range of valid ad hoc arbitration agreements to get around the CAL through the
choice-of-law rule. In 2006, the SPC issued an official interpretation, providing:
Article 16. The examination of the effectiveness of an agreement for arbitration which
involves foreign interests shall be governed by the laws agreed upon between the parties
concerned; if the parties concerned did not agree upon the applicable laws but have
agreed upon the place of arbitration, the laws at the place of arbitration shall apply; if they
neither agreed upon the applicable laws nor agreed upon the place of arbitration or the
place of arbitration is not clearly agreed upon, the laws at the locality of the court shall
Xiang Yu Grp. Co. v. Mechel Trading AG (MTA), 2004 XIA MIN REN ZI NO. 81 (Xiamen Intermediate Ct.
2004).
26

27

Id.

28

Id.
45

apply.29
Theoretically, if parties can select a foreign governing law that allows ad hoc arbitration,
the ad hoc arbitration agreement is valid. At the local level, the Beijing High Court offered an
opinion providing that an ad hoc arbitration agreement will be considered valid if it is valid
under the law in force at the place of arbitration, the seat of a designated arbitral institution,
or the law chosen by parties.30 Despite these judicial opinions, it was still uncertain whether
Chinese courts would apply a foreign governing law to validate an arbitration agreement
asking for ad hoc arbitration to take place in mainland China.31

Things became clearer when the Law on Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil
Relations (hereafter the Law on Application of Law) entered into force on April 1, 2011,
providing that “[t]he parties may choose the laws applicable to arbitral agreement by
agreement. If the parties do not choose, the laws at the locality of the arbitral authority or of
the arbitration shall apply.”32 In 2013, in a reply to the Beijing High Court regarding a case
involving an ad hoc arbitration clause designating arbitration in Hong Kong, the SPC stated
that, according to Article 18 of the Law on Application of Law, the applicable law of the
arbitration clause was the Hong Kong Arbitration Law, which allows ad hoc arbitration. The
arbitration clause was therefore valid.33

Interpretation on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the “Arbitration Law of the People's Republic
of China” (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 26, 2005, effective Sept. 8, 2006), art 16, 2006 (China).
29

Opinion Concerning Issues in Adjudicating Petitions for Ruling on Validity of Arbitration Agreement or for
Setting Aside Arbitration Awards (Beijing Municipal High Court, Dec. 3, 1999) [hereafter “Beijing Opinion”].
30

31

Tietie Zhang, supra note 17, at 373-377.

32

Law on Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations, supra note 16, Art 18.
Reply to Jurisdiction Disputes Between Haiwan Group Investment Ltd. and Taiwan Ltd. (promulgated by the

33
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In conclusion, current legitimate ad hoc arbitration agreements for foreign-related
disputes include: (1) agreements asking for ad hoc arbitration outside of China, (2)
agreements asking for ad hoc arbitration to be administered by a foreign arbitration
institution, and (3) agreements applying foreign governing laws that allow ad hoc arbitration.
Parties can choose a foreign arbitration law expressly or implicitly by designating a foreign
place of arbitration to validate an ad hoc arbitration agreement. Most foreign-related disputes
that are allowed to apply foreign governing laws can therefore move to ad hoc arbitration.34

Subject to the CAL, ad hoc arbitration agreements for purely domestic disputes are
strictly invalid. For example, in a 2004 case, an arbitration clause stated that “arbitration: ICC
Rules, Shanghai shall apply.” The SPC concluded that this type of arbitration agreement,
without designating an arbitration institution, is invalid.35 Interestingly, the Xiamen
Intermediate Court had reached the opposite conclusion in the case, XiangYu Group Co. v
Mechel Trading AG (MTA).36 In a case heard by the SPC in 2015, an arbitral clause signed
by two Chinese companies provided for ad hoc arbitration in Beijing, China, which applied
Chinese law.37 Citing Article 18 of the CAL, the SPC replied that the ad hoc arbitration
Sup. People’s Ct., effective Nov. 28, 2013) Min si ta zi, No. 58, 2013 (China).
Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning Application of the Law of the
People's Republic of China on Choice of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relationships (I) (promulgated by the
Sup. People’s Ct., effective Jan. 7, 2013) Fa Shi No. 27, 2013 (China)(regarding definition of foreign-related
disputes); Law on Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations, supra note 16, art. 4; Contract Law of
People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Nat’l People's Cong., March 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999),
Art 126, para. 2, 1999 (China).
34

Letter of Reply of the Supreme People's Court to the Request for Instructions on the Case Concerning the
Application of Zublin International GmbH and Wuxi Woke General Engineering Rubber Co., Ltd. for
Determining the Validity of the Arbitration Agreement (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. 2003, effective
July 8, 2004) Min si ta zi, No. 23, 2004 (China).
35

36
37

XiangYu Group Co, v Mechel Trading AG (MTA), supra note 26.
Letter of Reply of the Supreme People's Court to the Request for Instructions on the Case Concerning the
47

clause was invalid because it did not designate a qualified arbitration institution.38 In a
similar case, a disputed arbitration agreement between a Chinese company and a Singapore
company applied the “Chinese Arbitration Rules” (the term “Chinese Arbitration Rules” does
not exist and is not clear enough to designate an arbitration institution) and provided for
arbitration in Zhuhai, China.39 However, Jin Wan District People’s Court held that because
the seat of arbitration is Zhuhai, China, the parties have implicitly selected the Zhuhai
Arbitration Commission to administer their disputes.40 Even though such reasoning is
somewhat far-fetched, it shows that Chinese courts are willing to maximize their judicial
discretion to validate ad hoc arbitration agreements as long as the relevant disputes involve
foreign factors.41

On the other hand, existing judicial practice confirms that purely domestic disputes will
be governed by the CAL without any submission to foreign arbitration. In Siemens
International Trade Ltd v Shanghai Gold Land Ltd, the two parties were both foreigninvested companies registered in the Shanghai Free Trade Experimental Zone. The Shanghai
Voyage Charter Party Between Zhong Hai North Logistic Ltd. and Ben Xi Bei Ying Steel Group Import Ltd.
(promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., 2015, effective Sept. 21, 2015) Min si ta zi, No. 22, 2015 (China).
38

Id.

Chang Yu Jian She Ltd. v. SEMBAWANG ENGINEERS AND CONSTRUCTORSPTE LTD, Zhu jin fa min
er chu zi No. 35, Zhu hai jin wan (District People’s Ct., 2013).

39

40

Id.

The SPC, Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning Application of the Law
of the People's Republic of China on Choice of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relationships (I) (Fa shi [2012]
No 24, 7 January 2013), Art 1. “Where a civil relationship falls under any of the following circumstances, the
people's court may determine it as foreign-related civil relationship: 1. where either party or both parties are
foreign citizens, foreign legal persons or other organizations or stateless persons; 2. where the habitual residence
of either party or both parties is located outside the territory of the People's Republic of China; 3. where the
subject matter is outside the territory of the People's Republic of China; 4. where the legal fact that leads to
establishment, change or termination of civil relationship happens outside the territory of the People's Republic
of China; or 5. other circumstances under which the civil relationship may be determined as foreign-related civil
relationship.”
41

48

First Intermediate People’s Court held that even though this case did not involve the required
foreign factors, Siemens International could nevertheless count as a foreign-related case
because both parties are foreign-invested companies registered in the Shanghai Free Trade
Experimental Zone.42 The parties were therefore allowed to select foreign arbitration
institutions to administer their arbitration. Some scholars have claimed that the Chinese
judicial system is expanding the range of foreign-related disputes, especially those that
involve parties that are foreign-invested companies registered in FTZs, to promote the
Chinese national policy of free trade zones and the “One Belt One Road” policy.43 It is
reasonable to predict that Chinese courts will apply the same expansion when considering the
validity of ad hoc arbitration agreements for resolving disputes between foreign-invested
companies registered in FTZs.

c

Allowing Ad Hoc arbitration in Free Trade Zones

In the last days of 2016, the Chinese judicial system’s preference for enterprises
registered in FTZs finally took shape in a remarkable announcement from the SPC entitled
Advice on Providing Judicial Supports for Establishing Free Trade Zones (hereafter the
Advice).44 The Advice generally shows that the Chinese judicial system will support FTZs in
several ways. Article 9 of the Advice stipulates,
One or both parties are foreign-invested companies registered in Free Trade Zones.
Siemens International Trade Ltd v Shanghai Gold Land Ltd, Shanghai First Intermediate People’s Court
([2015] hu yi min si (shang) zhong zi No1555).
42

GAO FEI & XU GUOJIAN, GUIDE FOR CHINA AD HOC ARBITRATION PRACTICE 46-8 (Fa lv Publishing, 2017).
The SPC, Advice on Providing Judicial Supports for Establishing Free Trade Zones (hereafter Advice)
(Law )(Fa [2016] No. 34, 30 December 2016) , available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2016/12/id/149055.shtml (visited 30 September 2017).
43
44

49

They agree to submit disputes to arbitration abroad. After disputes arise, the parties
submit to the foreign arbitration and obtain an enforceable foreign arbitral award.
People’s courts shall not support one party’s claim that such arbitration agreement is
invalid…
People’s courts can consider agreements between companies registered in Free Trade
Zones, for submitting their disputes to arbitration by specific arbitrators, for a specific
arbitration, according to specific arbitration rules, to be valid. If people’s courts consider
such agreements invalid, they should report this decision to higher courts for review. If
the higher courts agree with the lower courts’ decision, they should report this decision to
the SPC for review. They can only issue the verdict after the SPC confirms the decision.45
First, the Advice confirms that disputes involving foreign-invested companies registered
in FTZs can be considered foreign-related disputes. Thus, these disputes are allowed to
submit to arbitration abroad if no party challenges the arbitral jurisdiction before the arbitral
awards are rendered. In particular, disputes between wholly foreign-owned enterprises
registered in FTZs are allowed to submit to arbitration abroad. This implies that foreigninvested companies registered in FTZs are also allowed to select ad hoc arbitration outside of
China.

The Advice then expands the application of ad hoc arbitration to all companies registered
in FTZs. The Advice stipulates four controversial requirements of legitimate ad hoc
arbitration.46 The first requirement is that only disputes between companies registered in
FTZs are allowed to submit to ad hoc arbitration. The second is that parties should designate
specific rules to govern their ad hoc arbitration. The Advice does not clarify how specific this
rule should be. For example, it is enough to provide ways of constituting arbitral tribunals, or
does the Advice strictly asks parties to indicate existing ad hoc arbitration rules? If the latter

45

Id.

46

Advice, supra note 44.
50

is the case, it is more likely that most parties will choose to apply some widely-used
international rules, like the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or LMAA Terms. The third
requirement is that parties should designate specific arbitrators. The SPC did not explain
whether it requires parties to indicate the identities of selected arbitrators, which is
unreasonable in practice. Moreover, the CAL stipulates several qualifications required of
professionals who can be selected as arbitrators in Chinese institutional arbitration.47 It is
uncertain whether the selected ad hoc arbitrators shall also fulfill these qualifications. Finally,
the specific places referred to in the Advice are not limited to Chinese FTZs. Theoretically, ad
hoc arbitration can take place in any corner of mainland China.

As the SPC has explained, so-called “specific arbitration” (ad hoc arbitration) is limited
to companies registered in FTZs and can take place anywhere else in mainland China under
proper judicial supervision.48 The SPC has said that if its experiment with ad hoc arbitration
originating in FTZs works smoothly, it will expand the application of ad hoc arbitration to
other areas of China and promote an appropriate revision of the CAL.49

3

Available Ad Hoc Arbitration Rules

Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 1, Art 13 “The arbitration commission shall
appoint fair and honest person as its arbitrators. Arbitrators must fulfil one of the following conditions: 1. they
have been engaged in arbitration work for at least eight years; 2. they have worked as a lawyer for at least eight
years; 3. they have been a judge for at least eight years; 4. they are engaged in legal research or legal teaching
and in senior positions; and 5. they have legal knowledge and are engaged in professional work relating to
economics and trade, and in senior positions or of the equivalent professional level. The arbitration commission
shall establish a list of arbitrators according to different professionals.”
47

The SPC, Interpreting and applying the Advice on Providing Judicial Supports for Establishing Free Trade
Zones, available at http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/images/2017-01/18/05/2017011805_pdf.pdf (visited 30
September 2017).
49
The SPC, supra note 48.
48

51

Ad hoc arbitration has many advantages compared with institutional arbitration.
Theoretically, ad hoc arbitration is more flexible, quicker, and less expensive than
institutional arbitration, but much depends on the arbitrators’ experience and availability to
handle the matter.50 If the parties have not agreed on the rules for constituting arbitral
tribunals and conducting arbitral proceedings in advance, it is highly possible that after
disputes have arisen they will find themselves trapped in disagreements about every detail of
arbitral proceedings. Additionally, applicable arbitration rules directly determine the
effectiveness of arbitral proceedings. Most importantly, they determine whether parties will
obtain an enforceable arbitral award.

Furthermore, ad hoc arbitration is quite vulnerable to delay tactics and litigant strategies.51
Any delay and deficiency in ad hoc arbitral proceedings greatly increases the expense of the
dispute resolution. Therefore, commentators have insisted that parties should include detailed
procedural rules in arbitration clauses for potential procedural obstacles.52 However,
considering the complexity of international trade and the comparatively limited time that
parties spend on dispute resolution provisions, it is not likely that parties spend much time
negotiating obscure ad hoc arbitration clauses. In practice, many contracts regularly include
simple words, like “arbitration in London,” to designate ad hoc arbitration. It is often

1 Bette J. Roth, Randall W. Wulff, & Charles A. Cooper, Alternative Dispute Resolution Practice Guide §
19:14 (Westlaw, 2016); Duncan Mackay & Kathleen Bryan, ‘Ad Hoc Arbitration Keeps Costs Down’ A Special
Report, NAT’L L. J. (2009); Samuel T. Reaves, Self-Administered Arbitration: Something Worth Considering,
UNDER CONSTRUCTION, Mar. 2007, at 4, 5.
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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SWITZERLAND: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 16 (Elliott Geisinger &
Nathalie Voser eds., (Kluwer Law International, 2013).
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recommended that parties adopt pre-established arbitration rules to govern their ad hoc
arbitration.53 Because the Advice requires parties to include specific arbitration rules in
agreements, it is necessary that arbitration rules for Chinese ad hoc arbitration be available.

Many entities provide arbitration rules for ad hoc arbitration. A set of arbitration rules
covers all aspects of the arbitral process, including a model arbitration clause. It sets out rules
regarding the appointment of arbitrators, arbitral proceedings, the calculation of arbitration
expenses, and the form, effect and interpretation of arbitral awards. Parties can simply
incorporate well-established arbitration rules in agreements to guarantee the effectiveness of
their ad hoc arbitration. The most widely known rule set is the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide a comprehensive set of procedural rules upon
which parties may agree for the conduct of arbitral proceedings arising out of their
commercial relationship and are widely used in both ad hoc and administered arbitration.54
Except for the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, there are other rules often used in ad hoc
arbitration. Examples include the London Maritime Arbitrators Association Terms (LMAA
Terms)55 and the Paris Home of International Arbitration Rules.56

Because China has no relevant tradition or previous experience, the time and legal
resources needed to establish more mature procedural rules for a future ad hoc arbitration
53
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market are limited. But the Chinese arbitration community is definitely on its way. Soon after
the SPC announced the Advice, the Zhuhai Arbitration Commission took the lead in
publishing the Heng Qin Free Trade Experiment Zone Ad Hoc Arbitration Rules (hereafter
Heng Qin Rules) in March 2017.57 The Heng Qin Rules are based on both the Zhuhai
Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, with minor
modifications based on features of ad hoc arbitration that originated in Heng Qin FTZ. In
addition, some Chinese practitioners have endeavored to contribute their experience to
drafting Chinese ad hoc arbitration model rules.58 The entire Chinese community has
consistently declared that, because China has a special background regarding ad hoc
arbitration, the production of tailor-made ad hoc arbitration rules to meet the specific needs of
Chinese companies is essential. The truth is that China has ambitions to achieve greater
speaking rights in cross-border trade and to reconstruct international economic order.59 The
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), for example,
recently released Arbitration Rules on International Investment Disputes.60 Producing its
own ad hoc arbitration rules is, therefore, imperative in the foreseeable future.

Arbitration rules are applied to streamline arbitral proceedings in order to prevent and
overcome potential causes of delay and inefficiency. In order to establish integrated and

ZHUHAI ARBITRATION COMMISSION, Heng Qin Free Trade Experiment Zone Ad Hoc Arbitration Rules,
http://www.zhac.org.cn/zcgzall/html/?528.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Heng Qin Rules].).
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mature procedural rules, China has to incorporate mechanisms to overcome the inherent
deficiencies and challenges that are expected in ad hoc arbitral proceedings. To examine the
essential components of well-established ad hoc arbitration rules, this research compares the
following aspects of the UNCIRTAL Arbitration Rules, the London Maritime Arbitrator
Association Terms 2017 (hereafter LMAA 2017), and the Heng Qin Rules: (1) the model
clause; (2) the sphere of application; (3) the default appointing authorities; (4) the solution
when parties fail to appoint arbitrators; (5) the qualifications of arbitrators; (6) the extra
power of arbitral tribunals on optimizing efficiency of the arbitral proceeding; (7) the
exclusion of liability; (8) the place of arbitration; (9) multiple parties; (10) interim measures;
(11) form and enforceability of arbitral awards; (12) mediation and settlement; (13) fees. A
detailed comparison is presented in the following table:
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UNICITRAL Arbitration Law (December

LMAA Terms 2017 (May 1, 2017)

16, 2013)

Heng Qin Free Trade Experiment
Zone Ad Hoc Arbitration Rules (April
15, 2017)

Model Clause

Any dispute, controversy or claim arising

This contract is governed by English law and all

out of or relating to this contract, or the

disputes arising under or in connection with it shall be

breach, termination or invalidity thereof,

referred to arbitration in London. Arbitration shall be

shall be settled by arbitration in accordance

conducted in accordance with one of the following

with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

LMAA procedures applicable at the date of the

Note. Parties should consider adding:

commencement of the arbitral proceedings: …

(a) The appointing authority shall be . . .

(iii) In any case where the LMAA procedures referred to

[name of institution or person];

above do not apply, the reference shall be to three

(b) The number of arbitrators shall be . . .

arbitrators in accordance with the LMAA Terms current

[one or three];

at the date of commencement of the arbitral proceedings.

Not provided

(c) The place of arbitration shall be . . .
[town and country];
(d) The language to be used in the arbitral
proceedings shall be . . .
Sphere of

Article 1. Parties agreed their disputes shall

Article 4-7. Parties agreed, sole arbitrator or both the

Article 3. Any statements that can be

application

be referred to arbitration under the

original arbitrators are full Members of the Association.

reasonably concluded to mean that the

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, including

parties exclusively selected this Rule.

investor-State arbitration.
Default

Article 6. Parties may agree on any person

Not provided

Article 20. The appointing authority is

appointing

or institution. Absence of agreement, any

the Zhuhai Arbitration Commission

authority

party may request the Secretary-General of

unless parties agree otherwise.

the PCA to designate the appointing
authority.
Solution when

Article 7-9. The appointing authority shall

Article 10. The provisions of section 17 of the Act will

Article 20. The appointing authority shall

parties fail to

appoint the second arbitrator or a sole

apply unless the parties agree otherwise. “The other

appoint arbitrators.
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appoint

arbitrator.

arbitrators

party, having duly appointed his arbitrator, may give
notice in writing to the party in default that he proposes
to appoint his arbitrator to act as sole arbitrator.”61

Qualification of

Not provided

Not provided

Article 20. Arbitrators should fulfill the

arbitrators
Extra Power of

requirements of the CAL.62
Not provided

Article 16. The tribunal shall have the following specific

the arbitral

powers to be exercised in a suitable case so as to avoid

tribunal

unnecessary delay or expense . . .

Exclusion of

Article 16. Excluding liability except for

liability

intentional wrongdoing.

Not provided

Not provided

Article 59. The Zhuhai Arbitration
Commission and its staff are exempted
from any arbitral tribunal’s liability in ad
hoc arbitration.

Place of

Article 18. Parties agree or determined by

Article 6. The seat of the arbitration is in England unless

Article 6. The place of arbitration is in

arbitration

the arbitral tribunal in the absence of

parties agree otherwise.

Zhuhai unless parties agreed otherwise.

Not provided

Article 36. Other party may join the

agreement.
Multiple parties

Article 10. Multiple parties jointly appoint
an arbitrator.

arbitration at the request of any party, by
discretion of the arbitral tribunal.

Interim Measures

Article 26. The arbitral tribunal may grant

Not provided

Article 13. The arbitral tribunal may

interim measures.

grant interim measures.

Form and

Article 34. All awards shall be made in

Article 22-28. The arbitral tribunal shall give reasons

Article 43. All awards shall be made in

enforceability of

writing and shall be final and binding on the

unless parties agreed otherwise.

writing and shall be final and binding on

arbitral awards

parties. The arbitral tribunal shall give

the parties. The arbitral tribunal shall

reasons unless parties agreed otherwise.

give reasons unless parties agreed
otherwise.
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Arbitration Act 1996, § 17 (entered into effect in 1997).
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Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 1, at art 13.
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Mediation and

Article 36. At parties’ request, the arbitral

Article 18 & 19. Parties shall inform the arbitral tribunal

Article 37 & 38. The arbitral tribunal

settlement

tribunals may record the settlement into an

of the settlement.

should review the settlement agreement

award.

and record it in a settlement statement or
award at parties’ request. The arbitral
tribunal may conduct the mediation at
parties’ request.

Fees

Article 40-41. The arbitral tribunal shall fix

Article 13 and The First Schedule Provisions set out fees

Article 17 & 18. Parties should negotiate

the costs of arbitration. The fees should be

payable to the tribunal and other related matters.

fees with arbitrators. In absence of

reasonable, taking into account any schedule

agreement, the appointing authority or

or particular method for determining the

Zhuhai Arbitration Commission

fees for arbitrators applied by the appointing

determine the fees.

authority.
Other rules

-

Intermediate Claims Procedure (ICP), Small Claims

Article 47. After review, Zhuhai

Procedure (SCP), Fast and Low Cost Arbitration

Arbitration Commission can transform

(FALCA), and Mediation Terms.

an ad hoc arbitral award to an
institutional arbitral award at parties’
request.
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Ad hoc arbitration and institutional arbitration rules have much in common regarding
arbitral procedures, multiple parties, interim measures, the form and enforceability of arbitral
awards, and the like. The biggest difference between ad hoc and institutional arbitration is
whether an arbitration institution is designated to administer the entire proceeding. Where
arbitration institutions are not involved, the ad hoc arbitration rules allocate administrative
responsibilities to other participants.

The first function of ad hoc arbitration rules is to direct communication between parties
and arbitrators regarding the organization of the arbitral proceedings. The claimant is
normally in charge of communication and notification before an arbitral tribunal is created.63
Once the arbitral tribunal is formed, the arbitral tribunal will then direct the proceeding. The
organization of the arbitral tribunal is, therefore, crucial to conduct the arbitral proceeding.
The three above-mentioned sets of arbitration rules all provide multiple solutions to guarantee
the formation of arbitral tribunals, especially when parties cannot reach an agreement on how
to compose a tribunal, or when one party fails to appoint an arbitrator. Both the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules and the Heng Qin Rules stipulate that, by default, appointing authorities
shall appoint arbitrators, while the LMAA Terms 2017 delegate the performing party to
appoint a sole arbitrator.64 Additionally, all three sets of rules provide a default place of
arbitration where parties have failed to reach an agreement.65 Moreover, the three sets of
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See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 54, at art. 3.

Compare UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 54, at art. 7-9, and Heng Qin Rules, supra note 57, at art.
20, with LMAA Terms 2017, supra note 55, at art. 10.
64

See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 54, at art. 18; see also LMAA Terms 2017, supra note 55, at
art. 6; Heng Qin Rules, supra note 57, at art. 6.
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rules have similar provisions for determining the allocation of fees.66 In negotiating fees with
arbitrators, parties must account for the complexity of the case and analyze any methods used
by the appointing authority for determining arbitration fees.

In other respects, the three sets of rules include unique provisions. Both the Heng Qin
Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules allow arbitral tribunals to record the parties’
settlement into arbitral awards, while the LMAA Terms 2017 require only that parties inform
the arbitral tribunal that they have reached a settlement.67 Furthermore, only the Heng Qin
Rules allow the arbitral tribunal to conduct mediation at the parties’ request.68 In addition,
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules exempt arbitrators from liability, apart from intentional
wrongdoing.69 Finally, the Heng Qin Rules only exempt its promulgator, the Zhuhai
Arbitration Commission, and its staff, from liability,70 while the LMAA Terms are silent on
arbitrator liability.

Regarding arbitrator qualifications, parties can theoretically select anyone as their
arbitrators because there is no list of arbitrators provided in ad hoc arbitration. Neither the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules nor the LMAA Terms 2017 impose limitations on the
qualifications of arbitrators, while the Heng Qin Rules stipulate that selected arbitrators

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 54, Art40-1; LMAA Terms 2017, supra note 55, Art 13; Heng Qin
Rules, supra note 57, art. 17-8.
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UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 54, art. 36; LMAA Terms 2017, supra note 55, art. 18-9; Heng Qin
Rules, supra note 57, art. 37-8.
67

68

Heng Qin Rules, supra note 57, art. 37-8.
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should fulfill the CAL’s requirements.71 Remarkably, the Heng Qin Rules include an
interesting provision that permits the arbitral tribunal to transfer ad hoc arbitral awards into
institutional awards, which are endorsed by the Zhuhai Arbitration Commission at the parties’
request.72 Permitting ad hoc awards to be transferred into institutional awards obviously aims
to avoid any potential violation of the CAL and increase the enforceability of the awards.

In the end, the LMAA Terms 2017 place greater emphasis on increasing procedural
efficiency. For example, the rules delegate specific powers to arbitral tribunals to avoid
unnecessary delay or expense, which include the ability to limit the discovery of evidence
and to punish parties who refuse to cooperate.73 The LMAA Terms also provide useful tools
for streamlining arbitral proceedings. The questionnaire and checklist provided in the end of
the Terms, for example, can help arbitrators explore the most appropriate way of progressing
through an arbitration. Remarkably, the LMAA establishes specific procedural rules for
disputes where claimants have claimed less than US$400,000 (LMAA Intermediate Claims
Procedure), less than US$100,000 (LMAA Small Claims Procedure), less than US$250,000
(Fast and Low Cost Arbitration) and Mediation Terms.74 The LMAA Terms thus provide a
wide range of procedural rules suitable for small claim disputes. Coincidently, in recent years
most arbitration institutions have followed this method to provide expedited procedural rules

71

Heng Qin Rules, supra note 57, art. 20.

72
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for small claims.75 The method is a promising direction for the international arbitration
community, enabling it to develop diversified and more efficient service.

In conclusion, ad hoc arbitration rules and institutional rules provide similar provisions for
conducting arbitration procedures, which offer specific instruments to promote the formation
of arbitral tribunals, determine fees, and guarantee procedural efficiency. Ad hoc arbitration
rules also often include provisions regarding the model clause, sphere of application, liability
of arbitrators, expedited procedures for small claims, and the like. In addition, to support ad
hoc arbitration taking place in mainland China, arbitration rules should mandate specific
considerations regarding the qualifications of arbitrators, default places of arbitration, and
default appointing authorities.

4

Constructing a Chinese ad hoc arbitration regime

The SPC’s movement to test ad hoc arbitration in FTZs is the beginning of an overall
reform of the Chinese arbitration regime. The international community has witnessed China
rapidly develop a mature and characteristic institutional arbitration regime. Most existing
laws and regulations are specifically tailored for institutional arbitration. The SPC’s judicial
interpretation and judges’ discretion are limited. Currently, the scarcity of legal resources,
available arbitration rules, judicial support and human resources is producing great
uncertainty around Chinese ad hoc arbitration. The SPC’s small step of confirming the
validity of some ad hoc arbitration agreements is far from sufficient to enable mainland China

Meng Chen, Emerging Internal Control in Institutional Arbitration, 18 CARDOZO JOURNAL OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 295, 305-07 (2016).
75
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to construct a complete ad hoc arbitration regime. Unless China revises its arbitration law and
garners more judicial support, parties who select ad hoc arbitration in mainland China will
remain burdened by many procedural and enforcement risks.

a

Debates regarding Chinese ad hoc arbitration

The SPC’s acceptance of ad hoc arbitration originating in FTZs greatly inspires the
Chinese arbitration community’s confidence in promoting Chinese ad hoc arbitration. Many
practitioners have asserted that we have reached the moment for dramatically expanding ad
hoc arbitration.76 However, before this moment really arrives, several issues need to be
properly addressed.

The first issue is whether it is necessary to promote or allow ad hoc arbitration in mainland
China. After all, as empirical research has shown, it is possible that disputants will end up
spending a great deal of time and money on inefficient ad hoc arbitral proceedings without
receiving an enforceable arbitral award.77 Many inherent deficiencies are to be expected in
the application of ad hoc arbitration in mainland China, especially if the Chinese legal system
is not well prepared for it.78 To give China the determination to revise its arbitration law and
tradition and to embrace ad hoc arbitration, practitioners should prove that ad hoc arbitration

Zhao Xiuwen & Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Reforming Chinese Arbitration Law and Practices in the Global
Economy, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 421, 435-377 (2006).
76

Roger Enock & Alexandra Melia, Chapter 6: Ad Hoc Arbitrations, in JULIAN D. M. LEW &HARRIS BOR
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2013).
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is a necessary part of a modern commercial dispute resolution regime. To some extent, the
most important reason for China to promote ad hoc arbitration is not that it is cheaper or more
flexible for resolving international commercial disputes. Establishing a completed ad hoc
arbitration regime is necessary to coordinate Chinese arbitration with international practice,
and to increase the influence of Chinese arbitral experience.79 Incorporating ad hoc
arbitration is also a significant step toward enacting the Chinese national policy of “One Belt
One Road” and other investment arrangements.80

If ad hoc arbitration does indeed prove desirable in mainland China, the next issue is
whether we should limit the application of ad hoc arbitration to foreign-related disputes or
FTZ disputes. This author believes that a determination as to whether it is necessary to
expand ad hoc arbitration to purely domestic disputes depends on whether the demand for
domestic dispute resolution will seriously exceed the capacity of Chinese arbitration
institutions. The fact that the number of Chinese arbitration institutions is rapidly
approaching the maximum number allowed by the CAL suggests that a domestic Chinese
arbitration market has great potential.81 Moreover, distinguishing international, foreignrelated ad hoc arbitration from purely domestic ad hoc arbitration is impractical and will, in
practice, cause a great deal of confusion.82 The SPC’s Advice aims to initiate a major reform
of the Chinese arbitration system, not only in ad hoc arbitration, but also in the sphere of
79
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foreign-related disputes, and eventually to expand such experience to the national level.83

If China allows ad hoc arbitration to resolve both foreign-related and purely domestic
disputes, the next challenge is whether Chinese companies and practitioners are willing to
select ad hoc arbitration rather than other dispute resolution methods with which they are
more familiar and for which they have trained. First of all, the Advice only delegates more
discretion to courts for validating relevant ad hoc arbitration agreements. Without further
judicial and legislative guidelines, practitioners remain in doubt about how far the Chinese
judicial system will go toward supporting ad hoc arbitration. Potential violations of the CAL
is an inevitable threat for Chinese courts that expand their discretion and also affects the
extent to which Chinese companies are motivated to select ad hoc arbitration. Other
psychological factors also negatively influence the accessibility of ad hoc arbitration. One
practitioner pointed out that arbitrators are generally uncomfortable about negotiating fees
directly with parties.84 Considering that some well-known arbitrators are already
overwhelmed with institutional appointments, it is clear that the number of arbitrators
available for ad hoc arbitration is limited. Counselors may also be reluctant to suggest ad hoc
arbitration to their clients unless they have plenty of relevant experience. Until China
properly addresses these challenges, the Chinese ad hoc arbitration market will not take off.

b

Uniform Chinese ad hoc arbitration rules
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Availability of arbitration rules is necessary for developing Chinese ad hoc arbitration. A
comparison of two popular international sets of rules and the Heng Qin Rules indicates that,
although the three sets of arbitration rules all aim to streamline arbitral proceedings, they
each have their own features. The Heng Qin Rules have special provisions related to default
appointing authority, arbitrators’ qualifications, and transforming ad hoc arbitral awards to
institutional awards.85 All these features reflect a specific Chinese conception of ad hoc
arbitration. China has an enormous and complicated institutional arbitration market. Most
arbitration institutions located in metropolitan areas that have FTZs are interested in
capturing the emerging ad hoc arbitration market. The Zhuhai Arbitration Commission, for
example, established the Heng Qin Rules designating the Commission as the default
appointing authority.86 In some cities that have FTZs, there are at least three local arbitration
institutions.87 If every institution attempts to participate in the ad hoc arbitration market by
providing ad hoc arbitration rules, the entire Chinese ad hoc arbitration system will be
devastated by increased confusion between institutional and ad hoc arbitration. Furthermore,
it is unreasonable for each FTZ to establish its own ad hoc arbitration rules. China currently
has twelve FTZs and more will probably be established in the future. China needs integrated
and internationalized arbitration rules that focus on streamlining and increasing the efficiency
of arbitral proceedings. Therefore, China needs a more qualified entity to establish rules
tailored for FTZ ad hoc arbitration. The author believes that the China Council for the
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Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) or a national arbitrator association are the
competent authorities to take on this responsibility. In addition, rules that relate to default
appointing authority and places of arbitration must be modified from a national perspective.
The default appointing authorities, for example, could be the local courts for the FTZs in
which the parties register, while the default places of arbitration could be the cities where
parties or respondents register. In 2015, for example, the SPC established a permanent circuit,
named the SPC First Circuit, in Shenzhen, Guangdong. The First Circuit hears cases and
appeals from Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan provinces. Under the auspices of the SPC,
the First Circuit in Guangdong Province can take on judicial supervision responsibilities for
ad hoc arbitration originating in three FTZs (Qian Hai FTZ, Nan Sha FTZ and Heng Qin
FTZ).

c

Confirming judicial supervision on ad hoc arbitration

The CAL’s requirement that all arbitration agreements designate a qualified arbitration
commission is the source of all obstacles in Chinese ad hoc arbitration. The Chinese judicial
system, led by the SPC, has taken many approaches to overcome the limitations of the CAL.
Currently, parties of foreign-related disputes can choose foreign governing laws or seats of
arbitration outside of mainland China to avoid applying the CAL. The SPC further expands
the application of ad hoc arbitration to disputes between companies registered in FTZs.
Theoretically, companies registered in FTZs can stipulate that their ad hoc arbitration will
take place anywhere in mainland China. The implication is that if ad hoc arbitration works
well in FTZs, the SPC will subsequently expand its application to the whole of mainland
67

China.88 Even though the SPC has taken the lead in reforming Chinese arbitration, its
potential violation of the CAL still impedes ad hoc arbitral practice. Without further
confirmation in the form of legislation, practitioners will be reluctant to have their ad hoc
arbitration take place in China because it may be considered illegitimate. Until China revises
the CAL the ad hoc arbitration will make up only a small proportion of the Chinese dispute
resolution market.

The SPC’s Advice is basically a declaration for enhancing judicial support for dispute
resolutions originating in FTZs and delegating judges more discretion in deciding the validity
of ad hoc arbitration agreements. More judicial supervision lies in courts’ authority to set
aside and enforce ad hoc arbitral awards. The good news is that Chinese courts may not set
aside ad hoc arbitral awards based on ad hoc arbitration agreements being found invalid after
the Advice was published. Because ad hoc arbitration that takes place on mainland China
between two Chinese companies does not fall within the sphere of the New York Convention,
setting aside and enforcing Chinese ad hoc arbitral awards is subject to Chinese Law. The
provisions provided in CAL and Chinese Civil Procedure Law regarding the setting aside and
enforcement of arbitral awards are all specifically applied to institutional arbitration.89 The
SPC could make legal interpretation to modify and expand existing national laws to ad hoc
arbitral awards. It could, for example, announce that people’s courts located in places of
arbitration or related FTZs have the jurisdiction to set aside ad hoc arbitral awards based on
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the same statutory grounds for setting aside institutional awards. In addition, it is expected
that the inconsistent Chinese laws for setting aside and enforcing purely domestic and
foreign-related arbitral awards will increase the complexity of judicial supervision in FTZ ad
hoc arbitration.90 In a word, there is a long way to go for China to provide adequate legal
resources for ad hoc arbitration.

d

Human resources

The experience and skills of arbitrators directly determine the quality of ad hoc arbitration.
Because China has never previously had an ad hoc arbitration system, Chinese arbitrators
have less experience of managing cases without the assistance of arbitration institutions.
There are certainly many experienced ad hoc arbitrators in the international market, but they
may not be familiar with Chinese substantive law, which will very possibly become the
governing law in disputes between two companies registered in FTZs. Nor does the Advice
stipulate the required qualifications for persons to be selected as ad hoc arbitrators. Some
have suggested that the relevant provisions in the CAL should apply.91 Even if that were the
case, however, this would still not be enough to ensure that Chinese ad hoc arbitration would
be in good hands.

Currently, China has a large group of arbitrators appointed by approximately 255
arbitration institutions. The number of arbitrators who possess the experience and ability to
administer ad hoc arbitral proceedings is much smaller, however. Apart from informal
90
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institutional guidelines, moreover, China has not established any official ethical regulations
for arbitrators. Notably, Article 399 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China
establishes criminal liability for arbitrators for intentional violations of the law.92 Most
ethical problems among arbitrators are not serious enough to trigger criminal liabilities,
however.93 Ethic rules and guidelines for the professional responsibilities of arbitrators are
still a vacuum in the Chinese arbitration system. Apart from the Criminal Law, there are no
official provisions to regulate the behavior of arbitrators in ad hoc arbitration. The Chinese
arbitration community cannot deny that corruption and negligence are serious ongoing
problems.94 The purpose of establishing ethical rules for arbitrators is to prevent unethical
behavior by arbitrators from depriving parties of fair arbitral proceedings and awards—not
throwing misbehavior arbitrators into jail. The best way to prevent potential violations is,
first, to clarify what kinds of behavior are prohibited or need to be disclosed at the beginning
of arbitral proceedings and, second, to establish liability rules and effective remedy methods.
Finally, a national code of ethics for arbitrators is also essential to the overall development of
the Chinese arbitration system.

5

Conclusion

Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by National People’s Congress, 1 June 1979,
effective 1 January 1980), art. 399 (P.R.C.).
92

93

For example, when arbitrators have ex parte communications with one party.

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethic Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Process:
What’s Happening and What’s Not, 56 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 949 (2002); Henry Gabriela &
Anjanette H. Raymond, Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: Basic Principles and Emerging Standards, 5 WYO.
L. REV. 453 (2005).
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China has a singular tradition of institutional arbitration due to the CAL’s prohibition of ad
hoc arbitration. To develop and internationalize Chinese arbitration, the SPC made many proarbitration moves in an effort to alleviate the restrictions imposed by the CAL. Parties in
foreign-related disputes are allowed to select ad hoc arbitration by choosing foreign
governing law or seats of arbitration outside of China. In 2017, the SPC expanded this
permission to ad hoc arbitration between companies registered in FTZs. It is also possible for
the SPC to further expand the FTZ experience to the whole of mainland China. This article
has shown that even though the SPC experimentally opened ad hoc arbitration for FTZoriginated cases, the current Chinese arbitration system is far from ready to conduct effective
ad hoc arbitral proceedings. After examining the judicial history and official guidelines
regarding FTZ ad hoc arbitration, this author asserts that the parties should, at a minimum,
provide rules for constituting arbitral tribunals, organizing arbitral proceedings, and selecting
specific places of arbitration in order to make ad hoc arbitration agreements valid. Providing
effective arbitration rules tailored for FTZ ad hoc arbitration is essential for fulfilling these
requirements. Instead of transplanting international rules or applying domestic rules
promulgated by certain arbitration institutions, this article has explained that China should
delegate more qualified entities to establish uniform ad hoc arbitration rules at the national
level. Furthermore, China is completely lacking in the legal resources, judicial supervision,
and human resources required for ad hoc arbitration. This deficiency will eventually prevent
parties from being able to select such arbitration. In consequence, China should reform its
arbitration regime by establishing national ad hoc arbitration rules, revising arbitration laws,
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confirming judicial supervision responsibilities and training practitioners to prepare for the
emergence of a full-fledged, nationwide ad hoc arbitration market.
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